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Another Look at Foreign Aid 
 
Gustav Ranis 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The discussion of the effectiveness of foreign aid has reached a high pitch.  This paper assesses 
the sorry past and present key arguments for a potentially more effective and sustainable method 
of aid delivery.  A key ingredient is to shake off the vestiges of structural adjustment and move 
towards true recipient country ownership complete with “self-conditionality” with aid recipients 
formulating their own reform packages.  This means donors become much more passive, act like 
a bank and respond to proposals which concentrate on a few critical areas over a three to five-
year period.  Policy-based program lending should respond to packages put together by the main 
domestic stakeholders with the help, if necessary, of independent third parties.  There should be 
no compulsion to lend; indeed, an aid hiatus is an indication that the new system is effective.  
What is required is for donors to stop using aid as a short-term foreign policy tool and for 
recipients to accept the notion that aid provides the opportunity to reduce the inevitable 
adjustment pains caused by real reforms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The foreign aid landscape has undergone a paradigm shift in the last few decades, with changes 
in the behavior of “traditional” donors and a new focus on selectivity in aid disbursement, as well 
as “new” donors and South-South cooperation playing an increasingly important role. Amidst 
these changes the debate over aid effectiveness rages on. What impact has aid had on recipient 
countries, and does aid really have the ability to induce policy reform? The structural adjustment 
loans of the 1980s were an attempt at prompting policy reform by imposing conditions on 
recipient countries. This proved ineffective for a number of reasons, and the aid community 
continues its search for the elusive “silver bullet” in foreign aid provision. This paper assesses 
the past effectiveness of aid, comments on new aid donors and outlines some of the key 
arguments in favor of a potentially more effective and sustainable method of conditional aid 
delivery.  
 
II. HAS AID BEEN EFFECTIVE? 
Foreign aid, a term encompassing a wide range of activities ranging from bilateral direct 
budgetary assistance to smaller NGO-led projects, is a constantly contentious topic in the 
development community. While there is little doubt that development aid has had its successes 
with improving the lives of impoverished populations around the world, discontent with the 
current aid system has become increasingly universal, with criticisms often coming from the 
same authors who also acknowledge the potential benefits of aid.  
 
Economic growth is considered by many to be a pre-requisite for poverty reduction. However, 
the links between poverty reduction and growth are extremely complex, and growth does not 
always result in poverty reduction. Poverty reduction dependent on the trickle-down effect of 
wealth in a growing economy is very fragile and does little to change the structural reasons 
behind poverty. Inequality matters – growth might benefit the rich a lot more than the poor in 
countries with high inequality.  
 
The link between aid and growth is also complex. Isolating the effect of aid on GDP growth is 
difficult and fraught with contention. Since a salient feature of aid has been conditionality, the 
question of whether aid has led to growth primarily involves testing whether policies along the 
lines of the Washington Consensus have led to growth or not.  
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Three schools of thought typify the debate over aid effectiveness: 
1. (More aid) While aid appears to have been of limited effectiveness to date, this is due to 
the fact that insufficient aid has been disbursed thus far. Scaling up aid will result in more 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The solution to improved aid effectiveness from 
this point of view is hence an increase in the quantity of aid. Jeffrey Sachs is one of the 
most vocal proponents of this point of view.  
2. (Problem aid) Contrary to its stated objectives, aid has done great harm, or at best has had 
little or no effect on recipient country economies. Proponents of this view believe that aid 
has lost its relevance in the modern economy and should be reduced, or eventually 
stopped altogether. Outspoken aid critic William Easterly is a proponent of this point of 
view. 
3. (Middle ground) The effectiveness of aid depends on the conditions under which it is 
disbursed – for example, factors such as a better policy environment and good governance 
are a necessity for aid to result in higher levels of economic growth. In the absence of 
these, aid might have insignificant or even negative effects on the recipient country’s 
economy.  
 
More aid  
Aid Statistics 
Global aid levels had been rising for almost a decade before 2011, which saw a trend-bucking 
decline in foreign aid in the wake of the global financial crisis. Aid flows from Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donor countries totaled USD 129 billion in 2010, the highest level 
ever, and an increase of 6.3 percent in real terms over 2009.  However, 2011 saw a -2.7 percent 
drop in real terms compared to 2010, with official development assistance (ODA) totaling USD 
133.5 billion.  
 
The United States remains the world’s largest donor and has led the way on aid increases, with 
net ODA disbursements of USD 30.2 billion in 2010, representing an increase of 3.5 percent in 
real terms over 2009. This is the highest real level of ODA ever recorded by a single donor 
country. In 2011, net ODA flows from the US amounted to USD 30.7 billion, representing a fall 
of -0.9 percent in real terms from 2010. At the Financing for Development conference held in 
Monterrey in 2002, President George W. Bush promised a 50 percent increase in US 
development assistance by 2006, and achieved that level three years before the target. President 
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Bush quadrupled aid to Africa between 2001 and 2006, from $1.4 billion to $5.6 billion a year 
(Glennie, 2008).  However, continuing tight budgets both in the US and in other OECD countries 
will put pressure on aid levels in coming years. 
 
The report of the UN Millennium Project, directed by economist and aid advocate Jeffrey Sachs, 
called for aid to all developing countries to rise to $195 billion by 2015, from $80 billion in 
2005. However OECD projections suggest slower aid growth ahead, with global country program 
aid slated to grow at a real rate of 2 percent per year from 2011 to 2013, compared to 8 percent 
per year on average over the past three years. 
 
The disbursement of aid, and hence the calls for aid levels to increase, has traditionally been 
justified on the grounds that recipient countries are in dire need of economic development and 
poverty reduction, and lack their own resources (both fiscal and social) to implement the 
necessary economic and political reforms. This is inextricably linked to the moral argument often 
put forward. Given the massive inequalities in today’s global income distribution, developed 
countries are technically in a position to help those who have not been as fortunate.  
 
In the field of healthcare, foreign aid’s most dramatic successes have occurred. Aid played a 
central role in the eradication of diseases such as smallpox and polio, as well as in immunization, 
where significant achievements were paid for in large part by aid money, bypassing government 
health systems and going directly to people who most need urgent help. Examples of programs 
and organizations include the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 
commitment of $15 billion over five years (2003–2008) from US President George W. Bush to 
fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, and public-private partnerships such as the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (often called The Global Fund) and the GAVI Alliance 
(formerly the “Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization”). Beyond healthcare, the 
development of high-yielding crops was a success. Notably, these were projects with narrowly 
defined objectives and clear targets.  Due to the chronic shortages in the public purse in poor 
countries, aid has also been an important source of cash in funding public services. 
 
In addition to infrastructure, aid could potentially also have positive effects on governance in 
recipient countries. Good governance can be defined as the institutions that establish a 
predictable, impartial and consistently enforced set of rules for investors. Low government 
revenue could be a binding constraint on the development of well-functioning bureaucracies and 
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legal systems, and foreign aid can be used for improved training and increasing salaries for 
public employees such as police, judges, tax collectors, etc. Aid also sometimes takes the form of 
programs intended to strengthen the legal system, public financial management and other 
responsibilities of the public sector. In recent years multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank, the IMF and bilateral donors such as USAID have made governance reforms a priority. It 
is assumed that aid could improve the quality of governance through conditionality, which will 
be elaborated on subsequently.  
 
For many years, the standard model used to justify aid was the “two-gap” model of Chenery and 
Strout (1966) - The first gap is between the amount of investment necessary to attain a certain 
rate of growth and the available domestic saving, while the second gap is the one between import 
requirements for a given level of production and foreign exchange earnings. At any moment in 
time, one gap is binding, and foreign aid fills that gap. It was argued that foreign aid could play a 
role in relieving these constraints and could eventually promote a level of investment that would 
enable the country to attain self-sustaining growth. However this model has been criticized on 
various grounds, with several critics highlighting the lack of theoretical or empirical justifications 
for assuming a short-run proportional relationship between growth and “investment 
requirements”, or the assumption that filling a “financing gap” determined by “investment 
requirements” will raise investment or growth in the short run. The proposed “three stages of 
growth” in the Chenery-Strout model have also been criticized on the basis that it represents a 
very specific view of the economic transition of a developing country. Regardless, this model 
wielded much policymaking clout and was often used, implicitly or explicitly, as the justification 
for aid disbursements.  
 
Despite the widespread dissatisfaction with the current aid system, all of the main actors in the 
international aid community appear to agree that the volume of aid disbursed to less developed 
countries has to increase. After stagnating in the 1990s, foreign aid indeed increased significantly 
in the new millennium, though it has declined slightly in recent years. It remains to be seen how 
quickly the developed countries will recover from the aftereffects of the global financial crisis 
and for aid levels to begin rising again.  
 
Problem aid 
Just as there are many examples of aid supporting initiatives that have done a lot of good, there 
are also many examples where interventions supported by aid have not done much good, but 
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indeed actively harmed the welfare of the poor. Controversial aid projects are often ones that 
focus not on bringing social benefits to people directly, but on boosting the economy. For 
example, dams that provide energy but lead to mass displacement, roads that help some 
economic sectors but cut through virgin forests etc. Donors often do not allow for the possibility 
that the aid will do more harm than good, usually embracing the attitude that while the aid may 
not be perfect it will at least do some good.  
 
William Easterly, one of the most outspoken critics of current aid modalities, maintains that one 
of the main problems with foreign aid is the disjoint between the amount of local knowledge that 
(mostly well-meaning) donors have, and the actual situation on the ground in recipient countries. 
Easterly highlights the distinction between the “Planners” in foreign aid, typically large aid 
agencies and developed-country donors, who attempt to impose top-down interventions on 
recipient countries. He argues that historically, poverty has not been diminished by such central 
planners but by “Searchers”, who explore solutions by trial and error and make piecemeal 
improvements to the economy based on what has been found to work. Easterly’s view is that the 
current aid system has been driven by the decisions of Planners, who attempt to “make poverty 
history” with grand efforts at international collective action and scaling up current quantities of 
aid, based on the belief that higher levels of aid will yield better results. 
 
Indeed, the notion that “aid buys growth” is an integral part of the ideology and ongoing mission 
of aid bureaucracies. This emphasis on the quantity of aid disbursed is understandable given the 
nature of the aid mechanism – evaluating the effectiveness of aid interventions has until recently 
not been a priority, and the quantity of aid disbursed is often used as a measure of an agency’s 
success in “reducing poverty” or advancing some social cause in a developing country. The UN’s 
campaign to double aid worldwide by 2010 rested largely on the idea that low levels of aid 
(rather than government policies or behavior) had been a central reason for the failure of the 
poorest countries to grow. However, the effects of aid on economic growth are notoriously 
difficult to measure, and it is unclear whether or not more money is really going to improve a 
country’s dismal record. The fact that some aid has been effective is also not particularly 
encouraging. It would be difficult to have spent so much money without doing some things right. 
The aid agencies themselves operating in this difficult environment do not have much incentive 
to achieve results, since the results are often unobservable – for example, one can hardly monitor 
growth itself for a given country for a given year, since growth in any given year or even over a 
few years reflects too many other inputs besides aid.  
 8 
Moreover, the governments of developed countries who have been behind most of the aid that 
has been disbursed are typically not driven by purely altruistic motives. Beyond helping the poor, 
aid is more often than not used as a foreign policy tool. Altruistic motivations are based on 
humanitarian interest in a recipient’s development, with aid targeted to countries that can use the 
money most effectively. On the other hand, strategic motivations are associated with the donors’ 
short term and long term political and economic interests, with foreign policy interests trumping 
“need” as a determinant of allocation levels. Since bilateral aid is often given as a result of 
donors’ political and economic interests, we can surmise why aid has not always been effective at 
spurring development. Strategic donors do not necessarily allocate aid based on the development 
it could create but rather on the political cooperation it could encourage. However, it should be 
noted that the strategic allocation of aid is not a death knell for aid effectiveness, since it is still 
possible for aid given to strategic partners to be well-allocated and prudently used.  
 
As an example of strategic aid allocation, the largest recipients of US aid are those countries seen 
as “strategically important”, and evidence suggests that the World Bank and IMF have usually 
followed US strategic priorities, since the US is the largest shareholder of both institutions. The 
US has made use of aid in Cold War foreign policy, the war on terror and also used aid to buy 
UN votes for the war in Iraq. In the new era of aid, a small number of donors, especially in 
Europe, have been focusing their attention on the poorest countries. However, this remains the 
exception and not the rule, and there are strong indications that any movement towards seeing aid 
as separate from foreign policy objectives is not shared by the US. It is clear that the US’ short to 
medium term interests are still that countries should be stable enough to reduce potential threats, 
rather than transformed enough to reduce poverty. In the words of Andrew Natsios, head of 
USAID in 2005, “civilized life depends crucially on transforming the troubled regions of the 
world…opening up the developing world to economic opportunity and expanding the ranks of 
democratic states…vital to US national security”.  
 
Another possible problem that might arise with aid is Dutch Disease. Aid is a transfer of foreign 
currency, and some combination of the following might potentially occur: (a) a shift of 
production from exports to non-tradable goods, which are then consumed locally; (b) a shift of 
production from import substitutes, allowing for goods and services to be imported instead of 
produced locally, thus freeing up domestic resources; (c) Additional imports, which add to local 
consumption, and were not affordable without aid. The first two are together known as Dutch 
Disease. Aid permits higher consumption of non-tradable goods than was possible without aid, 
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by switching productive resources into such non-tradable goods. A country generally experiences 
appreciation of the real exchange rate as it industrializes, and long run appreciation of the real 
exchange rate is driven by a rise in productivity, output and incomes. However, appreciation 
resulting from aid inflows is different: aid causes an immediate appreciation of the exchange rate 
before there has been an increase in productivity and output. This can have harmful effects 
resulting from a potential decline in exports, and the fact that aid finances a level of consumption 
and investment that is higher than the country’s economic output would permit. 
 
There is a second strand of Dutch Disease that could potentially be more worrying - namely, the 
impact of aid on decision-making. An external source of fund can encourage the persistence of 
inappropriate policy regimes. Instead of facilitating reform, aid in fact can take the pressure off 
the need to reform, leading to lower domestic savings, rent seeking, corruption, and capital flight. 
Despite recent attempts in the “new era of aid” to condition aid disbursement on “good 
governance”, aid itself has the potential to weaken government accountability by retarding the 
development of a healthy “civil society” underpinning democracy and the rule of law. Foreign aid 
may short circuit the processes necessary to build up these institutions by reducing government’s 
dependence on its citizenry for tax revenues, with politicians feeling more accountable to foreign 
donors than to their own taxpaying citizens. Aid can even increase political instability by making 
control of the government a more valuable prize. Foreign aid represents a potential source of 
rents - rent seeking often takes the form of increased public sector employment, large 
government subsidies to state-owned enterprises etc. Governments might devote more resources 
to obtaining political influence in order to gain more access to the rents from foreign aid, and 
reallocate talent and resources away from productive and towards redistributive activities. Aid 
funded projects have been accused of weakening the bureaucracies of recipient governments by 
siphoning away scarce talent from the civil service and hence hindering the development of local 
administrative capacity and effective public services. 
 
Given the proliferation in the number of donors in the international aid community, aid 
coordination has become an extremely pressing issue. Each recipient country has to deal with a 
multitude of donors, including multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs, each with their 
own agendas and methodologies. Large numbers of donors and projects overwhelm the recipient 
government’s capacity to manage and administer aid inflows. The immediate consequence of aid 
proliferation is an increase in transaction costs incurred by recipient governments. Aid 
proliferation also results in project duplication and the development of parallel infrastructures for 
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delivering similar outcomes, which is a waste of resources. Empirical results are in favor of the 
hypothesis that aid proliferation has a negative effect on the economic growth of recipient 
countries, especially in Africa (Kimura, Mori and Sawada, 2012). These authors conclude that if 
aid coordination leads to aid concentration by reducing transaction costs, then it may promote 
economic growth; however if the proliferation problem arises from a free-rider problem among 
donors, aid coordination may not facilitate growth.  
 
One approach that donors have taken in an attempt to make aid more effective is implementing 
projects instead of providing general budget support to governments, based on the justification 
that projects will bypass ineffective and corrupt governments and reduce the discretion of 
recipient countries in terms of how to spend the money. Radelet (2004) writes, “in weak, failing 
and poorly governed countries, donors should retain a strong role in setting priorities and 
designing programs.” Indeed, principal-agent theory suggests that the greater the divergence 
between a donor (the principal) and the recipient country (the agent), the more control the donor 
should have over how the money is spent. However, project aid has had disappointing results. 
Aid that finances projects is still fungible, in the sense that it frees up government money for 
spending on other items, possibly of dubious economic functionality. In addition, there has been 
evidence to suggest that projects in poor policy environments often fail (Easterly 2002), for 
example, constructing rural roads in a country where they will not be properly maintained or 
where government policies are unfriendly to agriculture is likely to be ineffective in spurring 
economic growth.  
 
The fungibility of aid - development assistance not being used for its intended purposes – 
continues to be a concern. In the fungibility literature, there seems to be a fairly wide support 
that, in general, sectoral aid tends to be fungible. This implies, that at the margin, sectoral aid 
usually finances something different from what donors intended. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and 
Swaroop et al. (2000) reach the conclusion that aid should therefore be tied to overall public 
expenditure programs that provide resources to crucial sectors, with a similar conclusion reached 
by the World Bank in a summary of a number of articles on fungibility. Since government and 
community ownership of projects is crucial, and since there is little hope of reaching consensus 
on spending priorities, donors should instead simply take for granted that their financing is 
fungible, and “help support the creation of an environment for productive public expenditures”. 
Alternatively, they may redirect aid towards more well-managed countries. However, Devarajan 
et al. (1999) point out that even when preferences between donors and recipients differ, it is still 
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not clear whether the presence of aid fungibility has positive or negative effects. It all depends on 
what the government does with resources released by the aid projects. Reducing aid to countries 
that are highly aid dependent and where aid is fungible would be equivalent to a decrease in the 
country’s own resources, with potentially detrimental effects. It also points to the importance of 
the quality of the overall public expenditure program of recipient countries. 
 
Middle ground - Aid is effective under certain conditions 
The school of thought that has been most influential in current policy discussions about aid is 
based on the belief that aid is effective only under certain conditions, for example in the presence 
of “good governance”, and is harmful or ineffective otherwise. The seminal paper by Burnside 
and Dollar (2000), which shows that aid has a positive effect on economic growth in the presence 
of policies that promote trade openness and political freedom, has had a great deal of policy 
influence.  
Based on theory, it is quite plausible that aid would promote growth in poor countries that 
manage to put good institutions in place. Possible case studies include the Marshall Plan after 
World War II, where significant amounts of finance were pumped into an environment of solid 
institutions and social infrastructure. Part of the Plan’s success was the fact that recipient 
governments were subject to a system of mutual peer review that forced them to explain what 
they would do with their Marshall Plan aid. An allocation of aid was arrived at through the peer 
review process, which did not involve the United States (the donor). The resulting positive effect 
on recipient countries disproves the hypothesis that aid is always money down the rat hole. 
Interpreting the causal effect of aid on growth is inevitably difficult, since there are many actors 
and more aid is typically given in response to slower growth. Some papers confirm the message 
of Burnside and Dollar that aid only works in a good policy environment, while others find that 
when other variables are added, the coefficient on the interaction between aid and policy 
becomes near zero and/or statistically insignificant. For example, Easterly, Levine and Roodman 
(2003) using a different time period in their regressions and a different measure of “good policy” 
found that the coefficient on the crucial interaction term between aid and policy was insignificant 
in the expanded sample including new data, indicating no support for the conclusion that “aid 
works in a good policy environment.”  This and other results indicate that the empirical links 
from aid to economic growth are far more fragile than the drumbeat of media and development 
agency references to the Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper suggest. There has been as much 
evidence that aid has an insignificant impact on growth as evidence that its impact is significant - 
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Clemens et. al (2004) find that the impact of certain types of aid on growth is very significant and 
does not depend on the recipient’s policy environment, while Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find 
little robust evidence of a positive or negative relationship between aid and growth.  
 
Despite the fact that there is little agreement in the academic community about the role of good 
policy in determining the effect of aid on economic growth, “selectivity” has become the new 
buzzword in the international aid community. Changes in the international aid architecture have 
prompted donors to become increasingly selective with regards to the countries to which they 
provide aid. Examples of recent changes in aid architecture, such as the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) debt reduction initiative and the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) 
process, are examples of this greater selectivity. Over time the role of poverty in countries’ policy 
and institutional environments for aid allocation has increased. Burnside and Dollar (2004) find 
that in the 1980s, there was no significant relationship between the quantity of aid disbursed and 
either the rule of law or democracy, indicating that the allocation of aid was not correlated with 
institutional quality, as measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rule of law 
index and the Freedom House democracy index. However, they find that aid is positively 
correlated with institutional quality in the 1990s. Where there are countries of equal poverty and 
population but differing institutional quality, the country with better institutions received more 
aid, which was not the case in the 1980s. 
Aid, if effectively designed and deployed, can be a powerful incentive for reform in recipient 
countries. Donors can influence the policy agenda and development policies adopted by recipient 
governments by linking support to specific developmental or reform activities. For example, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, a bilateral US foreign aid agency established in 2004, only 
works with “well-performing” countries that satisfy a series of minimum standards in three areas: 
ruling justly, investing in people and economic freedom. Conditions typically include 
macroeconomic stability (low-budget deficits and inflation), noninterference with market pricing, 
privatization of state- owned enterprises and openness to international trade, among others.  
A World Bank report (Collier and Dollar, 1998) estimates that if aid is redirected towards poor 
countries with good policies, more than twice the number of people could be lifted out of poverty 
for the same aggregate level of foreign aid. Consequently, there appear to be large potential gains 
from effective aid conditionality.  
Almost all of the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness (Paris, Accra, Buzan) have emphasized 
the need to promote country ownership in the disbursement of foreign aid. In an ideal world 
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where the aid mechanism functions perfectly, aid conditionality would be the primary means 
through which local governments and citizens in recipient countries take ownership of the aid 
process in their own country, with the eventual long-term objective of no longer being aid-
dependent. In an ideal world, therefore, the conditions imposed by donors would be effective, 
country-specific and feasible, and it would be in the best interests of recipient countries to 
implement these policy suggestions. Recipient country governments who successfully fulfill the 
conditions will be rewarded with aid disbursements and strong economic growth, while those 
who fail to do so will not.  
It is clear, however, that the above situation has generally not come to pass.  Regardless of donor 
intentions, the conditions imposed by donors – for example through the World Bank structural 
adjustment loan process, the PRSPs or through other multilateral or bilateral processes – are 
often not met, yet the funds are disbursed regardless. In addition, it is doubtful that policy 
suggestions are always made in the best interests of recipient countries.  
Increasingly, aid money is being selectively directed to countries that meet the condition of 
having “good policies”, however these might be defined. The “new selectivity” is supposed to be 
about rewarding countries that reform on their own, in contrast to structural adjustment that is 
now alleged to have imposed reforms on countries. In both cases, aid and concessional loans are 
selectively available to countries that meet conditions, so if any practical difference exists, it is 
extremely subtle.  
In fact, studies have largely concluded that conditional aid has no systematic influence on policy 
(Easterly 2005; Alesina and Dollar 2000). The reasons for the failure of aid conditionality lie on 
both the recipient side and the donor side of the aid equation. Among recipient countries, strong 
internal socio-political forces are often in place that are opposed to the effective implementation 
of policy conditions, based on the assumption that the policy would already be in place if this 
were not true, and conditionality would hence be unnecessary. As a result, policies implemented 
in response to conditionality requirements are often reversed or simply ignored in practice.  
On the donor side, the fundamental problem remains that both the success of past aid conditions 
in prompting reform and the failure of past aid conditions in prompting reform are taken as 
justifications for future aid, which means that the imposition of conditions turns out to be more a 
strategy of wishful hand-waving than a policy with consequences. Indeed, using data from 
around 200 structural adjustment programs, Svensson (2002) finds no link between a country’s 
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reform effort, or fulfillment of ‘‘conditionality’’, and the disbursement rate. 
Svensson (2002) also highlights a complementary issue that impedes the effectiveness of aid 
conditionality – the budget-pressure problem. In most donor organizations, the allocation and 
disbursement decisions are separated. While the aid allocation process is centralized, the 
disbursement decision is decentralized (country- or project-specific). This setup has resulted in a 
strong bias towards ‘‘always’’ disbursing committed funds to the ex ante designated recipient, 
quite irrespective of the recipient government’s performance. Thus, resources are not shifted 
towards countries where reforms actually take place, and ‘‘threats’’ of not disbursing committed 
aid if the recipient fails to reform are not credible. The bias, in turn, arises because the 
opportunity cost of a given aid budget (or a committed adjustment loan) for the disbursing donor 
agent is low. 
Studies of bilateral donor organizations have emphasized that, in practice, ‘‘spending the 
budget’’ has become a key goal in itself. Since the allocation of the overall aid budget across 
country departments is partly determined by the disbursement history, a country department 
failing to disburse the committed funds will most likely receive a smaller allocation the following 
year. Mosley et al. (1995) argue that the World Bank’s country loan officers are under intense 
pressure to meet country disbursement targets notwithstanding how unpromising that 
government’s subsequent implementation performance is. In addition, they highlight a 
coordination/free-rider problem. Keeping in mind what other countries have got away with, 
World Bank officials know that it will not be financially productive to make an example of one 
particular recipient who defaults on conditions by refusing to disburse the committed funds. 
Moreover, the enforcement of conditionality might be in conflict with other goals of the Bank, 
such as providing quick-disbursing finance so as to hinder a potential default on outstanding 
loans. 
Foreign aid can also result in political deterioration in the recipient country as a result of weaker 
government accountability. Such arguments generally center on the willingness of governments 
that receive foreign aid to reduce taxation of their citizens. Taxation is often thought to have 
played a key role in the development of Western representative institutions. For example, 
governments in the Middle East oil-dependent states have resisted pressures to democratize, 
helped by the fact that they do not need to tax their citizens to obtain revenue. Like any windfall 
to governments, foreign aid reduces the importance of domestic revenue and therefore the vital 
“social contract” of accountability between the government and its people. At the same time, 
citizens who know that policies are made to please donors will spend less time trying to pressure 
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their governments to change. Morrison (2009) argues that the institutions in place in a country 
determine how non-tax revenue is going to be used, given that the incumbent government has 
discretion over aid monies. Morrison shows that non-tax revenue generated by state-owned 
natural resources is associated with a lower probability of a regime transition in both democracies 
and dictatorships. Given that foreign aid can be seen as a form of externally generated non-tax 
revenue similar to natural resource rents, aid can also have the effect of solidifying whatever 
political regime is in place.  
 
The lasting impact of policy conditions is probably greater than that of the actual financial 
resource transfers associated with them. It is clear that most aid recipient economies, especially 
those in Africa, have changed very significantly along the lines of the Washington Consensus 
since the 1980s.  In practice the tenets of the Washington Consensus were applied so rigorously 
and without regard for political context that they generated many negative outcomes for recipient 
countries. Other policies being forced on recipient countries are highly controversial and might 
lead to lasting damage. In the words of Joseph Stiglitz, “there is no consensus except that the 
Washington Consensus did not provide the answer”.  
 
Regardless of how much ownership in foreign aid is emphasized, conditionalities have reached to 
the very heart of basic policymaking in many recipient countries, from stipulating how to deliver 
basic services like health, to deciding how political systems should be structured. Donors have 
effectively influenced recipient government policy for decades. Ironically, the policy conditions 
requested by donors have not always been in the best interests of recipient countries. Primary 
among such policies has been trade liberalization. Many recipient countries have reduced tariff 
and quota barriers in response to aid conditionality demands. Such tariff reduction have 
sometimes led to the devastation of important industries, for example in Kenya. When trade 
barriers were removed, cotton exports from Kenya had to compete with underpriced US cotton, 
which led to years of underinvestment in the Kenyan cotton industry and exposure to distorted 
and volatile global markets. Tariff reduction also affects the size of national budgets and the 
amount available for spending on development, since import tariffs are administratively one of 
the easiest taxes to impose. Another common conditionality is the reduction of state subsidies to 
important economic sectors. In Senegal, the government privatized the collection and sale of the 
groundnut harvest and the distribution of groundnut seeds in response to donor pressure, leading 
to huge losses for farmers who received far less for their crops.  
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Some have argued that aid conditions are not to blame for the wholesale shift in direction of 
Africa’s economic and social policies, and that African governments must take responsibility for 
their decisions. This argument does contain an element of truth, since African governments have 
occasionally fought off pressure from donors to implement reforms they oppose. However the 
story in aid-dependent countries has usually been one of subservience to donor demands. From 
such a large and diverse group of aid recipients one would expect an equally large and diverse 
range of responses to the various problems of poverty and development. Instead, the responses 
have very much fitted the blueprint designed in Washington. Selectivity in aid disbursement can 
therefore be seen as a more subtle way of pressurizing governments into implementing certain 
policies; only this time the policies need to be implemented in advance of receiving aid, rather 
than during the period of aid disbursement. 
 
An Effort at Reform 
In an attempt to strengthen the links between poverty reduction, growth and debt relief, the 
World Bank and IMF introduced the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1996. 
The initiative aimed to grant debt relief to countries conditional on structural reforms, and 
required from eligible countries suggestions for policy change in the form of Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), intended to be more 
participatory than previous efforts, are documents that outline the government’s poverty 
reduction policies, and are drawn up in consultation with NGOs, the private sector, civil society 
and other important stakeholders.  
 
This strategy has been justified as an attempt to change the institutional environment surrounding 
foreign aid, by encouraging recipient countries to take ownership of their own reforms and have 
the donor community play a supporting role. Many saw this as an important step towards country 
ownership of aid conditions, and indeed there have been some positive experiences with the 
PRSP approach. In Ghana, civil society successfully influenced the PRSP towards a focus on the 
especially poor areas of the country. In Zambia, discussions with key stakeholders shed light on 
the harm being done by rapid agricultural liberalization and led the government to re-introduce 
support for some sectors.  
 
In general, however, donors have not respected the PRSP process. Of the 20 countries with 
PRSPs completed by March 2003, 16 had previously agreed to IMF programs, prior to the 
completion of the PRSP. Indeed, in what is ostensibly a recipient-led process, the international 
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financial institutions continue to play a significant role in determining the nature of the reforms 
and provide instructions on how the PRSPs should be prepared. For instance, the World Bank 
distributes a Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies that is intended to serve as a guide to 
recipient countries on how policies towards such issues as public spending, environment and 
gender should be formulated.  In addition, donors remain in the position to pick and choose 
which items on the list they will support, while claiming to be supporting government priorities.  
In practice, the PRSPs have involved less “ownership” than advertised, with the process coming 
to resemble the structural adjustment programs of the previous aid era, which the aid community 
has agreed were far from successful.  Both are negatively affected by the fact that both donors 
and recipients have an incentive to put together a list of reforms simply so the aid can be rapidly 
disbursed.  IFI staff and loan recipients are similarly motivated - the former seeing their rewards 
and promotions in terms of the volume of aid disbursed, the latter in terms of the relief expected 
from the rapid disbursement of money.  
Indeed, the IFIs themselves have acknowledged the problems inherent in the PRSP process. The 
PRSP Progress in Implementation paper prepared in 2003 for the Bank/Fund Annual Meetings 
indicated that the PRSP process is charged with multiple objectives, many of which are in 
tension. This "inevitably means that PRSPs will reflect compromises". The report expresses 
concern about the extent to which government and civil society have been actively involved in 
creating and debating strategies. Also, it states that "the government took a material lead in donor 
coordination in only three of the 48 PRSP countries studied", and cites evidence that priorities 
are being motivated by the supply of donor financing rather than deriving from newly articulated 
national policy agendas. 
One major problem was that these programs were never truly ‘owned’ by the recipient countries 
and that, consequently, the entire process came to resemble a “ritual dance”. Donor agencies have 
internally-generated incentives to disburse funds, and are unable to commit to withholding the 
money should the recipient not comply with the stated conditions. At the same time, recipient 
countries face large obstacles to reform, and base their expectations on observations of previous 
instances under the structural adjustment framework in which funds were disbursed to countries 
that did not fulfill conditions. Both parties end up simply going through the motions of preparing 
for reform. The end result is a situation in which both the recipient and donor are fully aware of 
the eventual outcome from the outset – that the funds will be disbursed regardless of the actions 
taken by the recipient.  
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III. THE APPROACH OF NEW DONORS  
An entirely new set of countries and multilateral agencies now provide aid, including bilateral 
donors who are not part of the OECD, e.g. China, Arab countries, India, and an increasing 
number of multilateral aid organizations.  The types and categories of aid-funded projects have 
also changed. Through the 1990s major donors provided a significant portion of their aid for 
infrastructure. However since 2000 infrastructure aid from DAC donors has dropped off 
considerably and has constituted an average of just 10% of total DAC bilateral aid. Non-DAC 
donors’ continuing interest in infrastructure, however, offset the sharp decline of DAC donors’ 
support of such projects.  
 
Developing countries such as China and India are said to have a different approach to recipient 
governments and with respect to policy dialogue, because they know how it feels to be on the 
recipient side of the aid relationship, even though aid has played a minimal role in the economic 
development of both countries. China and India are also more appealing to recipient governments 
because they themselves are economic success stories, which achieved formidable development 
goals over the past decades. Both donors are known for being “pragmatic” and do not sign on to 
agreements about aid modalities which tend to be dominated by major donor countries. Indeed, 
India and China do not have a clear and prescriptive idea of what “good policy” is, in contrast to 
the much-vaunted “selectivity” of the traditional donors. The greater involvement of China, India 
and other emerging donors in aid recipient countries enhances the leverage of recipient 
governments in choosing with whom to partner, for example if they wish to avoid aid 
conditionality. 
Chinese aid has doubled since the late 1990s and consists primarily of project aid, technical aid, 
humanitarian and multilateral aid. There are doubts about the size of China’s aid program, since 
there is often no clear distinction between aid, trade and investment. Various sources have put 
the figure between $1 and $2 billion, with aid to Africa about half of that. The share allocated to 
Africa in total Chinese aid has increased in recent years.  
 
Increasingly China has also become an important investor abroad, with investments made by 
both private and state companies and supported by government policy. The link between aid and 
economic interests has always been much stronger for China than for “traditional donors”, or at 
least much more explicit. China’s investments in developing countries is strongly shaped by 
China’s long-term strategic interests in raw materials, energy and food security. Trade between 
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China and Africa has been increasing rapidly, to over $100 billion in 2008, making China 
Africa’s third largest trading partner. China’s main imports from Africa include oil and gas; and 
its main exports include machinery, vehicles, textiles and manufactured products.  
 
China is complementing hard economics and global politics with carefully designed and 
internally negotiated “soft power”, including through a resurgence of international aid. Aid from 
China tends to be connected to commercial activities, for example infrastructure projects. Most 
international commentators agree that China’s focus on infrastructure fills a gap left by old 
donors. China’s aid is also primarily bilateral, and is made up of a combination of grants, 
concessional loans, and debt relief, project investments, training and technical assistance. Instead 
of ex ante conditions, China has a budget for a country and then agrees with the government on 
how the money is spent. The absence of political conditionality (which according to Chinese 
officials does not foster development) and China’s recent domestic economic success helps it 
win the trust of recipient governments. Chinese aid also does not change much from year to year, 
unlike that of the more traditional donor community, with its shifting aid fashions and fads. 
Some of the challenges still facing Chinese aid policy, however, include issues with governance 
and corruption, debt sustainability and the necessity for transparent aid practices. 
Chinese views stress the continuity of its aid program since the period of Chairman Mao. China’s 
foreign aid to Africa has amounted to 44.4 billion RMB implementing about 900 projects on 
infrastructure construction and social services provision since it started providing aid to Africa in 
1956. The aid program was re-developed in the 1990s with China’s rapidly growing economic 
interests in the African continent, particularly in the resource-rich economies. China’s current 
international strategy is framed in a language of brotherhood and non-interference, providing an 
alternative to the post-colonial relations particularly of European countries. China’s support for 
particular countries, notably “fragile states” like Cambodia, Congo and Angola, does provide an 
alternative to the support that comes with heavy conditions of the old donors. The aid program 
has become part of the “soft power” that China employs in its foreign policy dealings.  
 
While recent debates often stress the distinctiveness of China’s aid program, many of its 
characteristics find clear similarities with “old donors”. China’s emphasis on non-interference is 
often held up as a distinctive trait, but old donors too have increasingly emphasized that it is up 
to the recipients to define the uses and objectives of aid. China does not officially sign up to an 
OECD (Paris) consensus, for example with respect to budget support and conditionalities, but it 
is useful to note that very few “traditional” donors now end up supporting the implementation of 
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these conditions.  
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD – A SUGGESTED STEP FORWARD 
Self-conditionality  
For conditional aid to become more effective, the aid community has to shake off the vestiges of 
structural adjustment and token “recipient country ownership”. Aid recipients need to have real 
ownership of policy reforms, instead of old-fashioned donor conditionality. Looking ahead, a 
possible solution to the issues that plague conditional aid lies in self-conditionality, a system that 
recognizes the key role of potential aid recipients in formulating their own reform packages.  
Under a new framework of self-conditionality, the donor institution in question acts like a 
commercial bank. It would play a much more passive role and instead allow potential borrowers 
to take the initiative in presenting a “self-conditionality list” that outlines a multi-year reform 
package. As mentioned in Ranis (2011), given that it would be impossible for a government to do 
too many things at once on a number of different policy fronts, realism calls for the self-
conditionality list to concentrate on a few critical self- determined areas over any three- to five-
year period. While uncertainties about the “right” reform package undoubtedly will still exist, a 
package put together by main domestic stakeholders stands a better chance of succeeding than 
one that is subject to either implicit or explicit donor conditionality. In addition, the institution 
should disburse funds on the basis of a commitment to future reform, rather than assessing the 
effectiveness of past reforms and disbursing aid accordingly. If help is required in formulating 
such a reform package, it should come from independent third parties, not from major donors, 
and should preferably be financed by foundations or other private parties – a separation of advice 
from financial support.  
Additionally, instead of the grants-for-projects approach, favored by Easterly and Skarbek and 
Leeson, policy-based program lending or grants should be relied upon under the framework of 
self-conditionality. Traditionally, donors have provided aid either through the financing of 
specific projects (project aid), which often involved direct participation in their design and 
implementation, or through providing support to the recipient government’s budget (conditional 
budget support) while imposing conditionality on how to allocate the available resources. 
Conditional budget support and project aid have both their own shortcomings when the 
objectives of donors and recipients are not perfectly aligned. The effectiveness of general budget 
support depends on what the aid money is actually spent on, while project aid carries the risk of 
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crowding out development expenditure that the government would have undertaken in the 
absence of foreign aid, and therefore running the risk of aid misplacement.  
As mentioned in Ranis (2011), some of the more successful cases of foreign assistance, including 
Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960s and Costa Rica and Chile more recently, give ample 
evidence of the power of fast-flowing, policy- based lending, appreciated by recipients and 
enabling them to buy off domestic veto players. Project aid clearly has the ability to provide 
additional local capacity at the micro level and tends to be more politically appealing: however 
this does not necessarily render it an effective instrument for poverty reduction on a larger scale. 
Under the framework of self-conditionality, rather than having donors finance individual 
projects, the entire country should be viewed as “the project”, given the well-known fungibility 
of resources.  
There should be no compulsion to lend on the part of donors, and agreement on the conditions 
may or may not be reached in every instance. The quantity of loans disbursed should not be used 
as a measure of the success or effectiveness of the aid institution, and neither should it be tied to 
the compensation packages of executives working in the institution.  
To maintain credibility, the donor institutions will have to commit to cutting disbursements if 
self-conditionality terms are not met, to make it clear that the “ritual dance” will not be repeated. 
On the quantitative side, the institution would require sufficient funds to enable a temporary 
increase in aid for successful applicants over a period of three to five years, long enough to match 
the political and economic adjustment requirements of the proposed reforms. 
A potential model for such an institutional change is a modified Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), an independent US foreign aid agency that aims to reduce poverty by 
promoting growth. The MCC makes use of 17 policy indicators to determine recipient country 
eligibility and negotiates compacts with these countries to fund specific projects. The MCC 
currently rewards countries for past performance, rather than their commitment to future policy 
changes, and has already made a number of exceptions to its own rules by providing strategic aid 
to advance US foreign policy aims, casting doubt on the claim that it is all that different from 
typical corruption-prone aid programs. As mentioned, however, aid allocated strategically is not 
necessarily aid wasted – there is still scope for achieving a “second-best” outcome if the money 
is utilized effectively.  
Adopting such a framework would require a sea change in the current culture prevalent amongst 
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participants in the foreign aid community. Donors must be willing to stop using aid as a short-
term foreign policy tool, and recipients must accept the notion that aid represents their 
opportunity to reduce the inevitable adjustment pains caused by real reforms, not to take the 
pressure off.  
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